Sukuk: a potential for stability and development in the GCC by Taoual, Safiyah
  
 
Economics Discussion Papers 2016-7 
 
 
SUKUK: A POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GCC   
 
Safiyah Taoual 
 
Kingston University 
London, UK      
 
8 April 2016 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the significance of Islamic Sukuk instruments for stability in the GCC. 
As a result of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, interest in financial stability has increased. 
Islamic scholars suggest that Islamic financial institutions and products have the potential to 
contribute in achieving a more stable economic environment.  This paper analyses Sukuk, an 
Islamic financial instrument with both bond and equity traits; and how it can contribute to 
achieving a more sound and resilient economic environment in the GCC. Findings suggest 
that Sukuk do have the potential to effectively contribute to the GCC’s economic stability; as 
long as they adhere to the pure Islamic financial principles and avoid trying to be comparable 
to conventional bonds. Currently, however there appears a heavy reliance on shorter term 
issuances, along with the majority of issuances in the USD, a heavy reliance on real estate as 
both a means of financing an underlying collateral in Islamic securitization; elements which 
could be destabilising especially during destress. The originality of this paper lies in its 
empirical contribution, as it, for the first, time sets out systematically the characteristics of 
Sukuk issuance in the GCC region with respect to Sukuk maturity, issuance currency and 
sectoral distribution.  It also assesses the various Sukuk structures and the underlying risks 
involved; as well as the impact of collateral in Islamic securitization. 
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 Introduction I.
This paper represents an analysis of the Islamic form of securitisation Sukuk (Islamic 
bonds). Sukuk are investment certificates with both bond and stock-like characteristics, 
issued in order to finance the production of tangible assets or trade activities. The main 
distinction being that a bond represents a contractual debt obligation, where the issuer is 
obliged to pay interest to the debt holder at an appointed date. In comparison, Sukuk holders 
each possess an undivided beneficial ownership of the underlying asset, which entitles the 
holder to shares of revenues generated from the Sukuk asset. (Thomas et al, 2005)  
Sukuk, asset backed securities, which represent the Sharia1 compliant version of 
conventional bonds; are the second largest product composition of Sharia compliant assets 
(12%) after Islamic banking transactions (83%). Sukuk have witnessed substantial growth 
rates in the last few years, as annual issuances of Sukuk have almost tripled from USD45bln 
in 2011 to USD118.8bln in 2014 (MIFC Annual Sukuk Report, 2015). In addition, the latest 
popularity has extended to non-Muslim countries, leading to a demand  of Islamic Sukuk 
currently in excess of USD 300bn; with the estimation that global demand is to reach USD 
900bn by 2017 (EY, 2015). 
Interest in the Sukuk market has surged, as an alternative finance option, from a range of 
sovereign, national and multinational institutions from advanced, emerging, and developing 
economies; with the aim to finance investments in a broad spectrum of economic activities 
and development projects.(Kammer. A et al, 2015) 
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the growth of the asset based securities Sukuk in 
the Gulf Corporation Countries (GCC)2. The papers contribution is an empirical one. For the 
first time, the characteristics of Sukuk with regards to Sukuk maturity, issuance currency and 
sectoral distribution; are set out systemically.  The GCC region represents the second 
largest issuers in the world of Sukuk after Malaysia with 37.7% and 42.3% of world 
issuances respectively, as of the 1st quarter of 2015. (MIFC, 2015)  This makes the paper 
important for financial stability and policy making in the region. 
                                               
1
 Sharia compliant means adherence to the Islamic jurisdiction principles from the holy Quran and 
Sayings of the Prophet Muhammed. 
2
 The GCC represents an economic and political union of the majority of the Arab countries in the 
Persian Gulf. The union includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) (GCC, 2014). 
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It challenges the scepticism suggesting that Sukuk are similar to conventional bonds as well 
as reviewing Sukuk’s stabilising element; arguing that Sukuk do have stabilizing potential if 
utilised in the right manner.  Currently, Sukuk are, however, mainly used by non-Islamic 
financial institutions with weaker issuances by the other developmental industries. 
This paper starts by reviewing the concept of Sukuk, its mechanism, challenges and its 
potential contribution to stability. In the second section then analyses the developments in 
the Sukuk markets both internationally and in the GCC . The third section then reviews the 
stability elements with regards to duration, issuance currencies, Sukuk structures and 
underlying risks as well as the underlying collateral in Sukuk securitisation. The paper 
concludes with policy recommendations as to how the Sukuk market can be improved. 
 
  Sukuk an analysis  II.
1. Sukuk: Definition and Mechanism 
The Islamic debt instruments Sukuk represent the Islamic form of investment certificates; 
which are comparable with conventional bonds. The former are in conformance with Sharia 
principles and provide an alternative source of financing especially for large corporations and 
sovereign entities. (Alam et al, 2013; Godelwski et al, 2013) Over the last couple of years the 
global Sukuk market had steadily grown, as annual issuances approximately tripled from 
USD45bln in 2011 to USD118.8bln in 2014 (MIFC, 2015). 
Sukuk are “investment certificates with both bond and stock-like traits, issued in order to 
finance the production of tangible assets” or trade. (Godelwski et al, 2013, p746)  Much like 
bonds, Sukuk have a set maturity, whilst holders are accredited a consistent stream of 
income over the life of the Sukuk along with a final principle payment at maturity. In addition, 
Sukuk represent a bear profit coupon that can be traded at a normal yield price. (Godelwski 
et al, 2013, Zakaria et al, 2012) 
Yet, contrary to conventional bonds, Sukuk are not debt instruments with guaranteed returns 
and cash flows; Sukuk do not pay interest3, as returns on Sukuk are linked to the profit 
generated through real transactions derived from an underlying real business risk. (Zakaria 
et al 2012)  Sukuk can be compared to a trust certificate with a relative or undivided stake in 
an asset or a pool of assets. This interest enables the right to the corresponding share of 
                                               
3
 Paying and receiving interest is prohibited under Islamic jurisdiction. 
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cash flows, risk and benefits; which are derived from owning the assets. (Godelwski et al, 
2013). This is achieved as Sukuk enclose a selection of contracts to construct financial 
obligations whereas conventional bonds create indebtedness through loan issuances. 
(Zakaria et al 2012) 
While Sukuk structures are comparable to conventional asset-backed securities (ABS) or 
covered bonds; Sukuk are in most cases “asset-based rather than asset-backed, with the 
underlying asset being necessarily Sharia compliant 4in both nature and use” (Godelwski et 
al, 2011, p7); implying that Sukuk must be related to a particular asset, service or project for 
a set extent of time. Sukuk for example have been used in infrastructure and government 
projects, with underlying assets such as real estate. (Jobst et al, 2008)  On the other hand, 
Sukuk and shares of stock can be regarded as similar in the sense that returns on both 
assets are not guaranteed; in addition to both contracts implying ownership claims. 
However, it’s important to note that equity shares represent ownership claims with regards to 
the company as a whole with no maturity date; whereas Sukuk represent ownership of a 
particular asset with a set maturity date. (Godelwski et al, 2013) 
The Sukuk arrangement consists of three parties:  the originator of the Sukuk aiming to raise 
funds, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) who issues the Sukuk certificates, and the 
investors who purchases the Sukuk certificates. (Tariq & Dar, 2007) 
In the basic Sukuk structure, the originator establishes a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
through whom Sukuk are issued with the aim to raise funds from investors. The SPV, who 
represents a separate independent legal entity, acts as the investor’s trustee; investing the 
funds collected in either an asset, project or business, which is provided by the originator. 
The SPV is also responsible for meeting the payment obligations to investors as they are 
paid according to the performance of the underlying assets.  Then at maturity, the underlying 
assets are repurchased by the originator, whilst proceeds are applied in order to redeem the 
Sukuk certificate. (Lackmann, 2015, Tariq & Dar, 2007) 
 
Therefore, the Sukuk issuance procedure can be determined in four main steps: 
                                               
4  Sharia compliant financing is based on ethical financing.  Under Islamic jurisdiction, it is prohibited to 
invest in activities such as manufacture or distribution of alcoholic or pork products or pornography. In addition to 
significant gaming (gambling, including casinos), brokerage, interest-based banking… 
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1. The establishment of the SPV by the originator (who is raising funds). The SPV then  
issues the Sukuk to raise the necessary funds  
2. The funds raised through the SPV are utilised to purchase the underlying assets from 
the originator. 
3. Any income or profits generated from the assets are delivered to investors according 
to the agreement set. 
4. At maturity the underlying assets are repurchased by the originator and proceeds are 
utilised for redemption. (Lackmann, 2015) 
Figure 1: Basic Sukuk Structure 
 
Sources: Lackmann, 2015 
Generally, Sukuk are classified in to two main structures, asset based and asset backed. 
Asset based issuances are generally referred to as Islamic bonds; whilst asset backed 
securities are referred to as Islamic securitizations. Sukuk can also come in many 
contractual forms; the main types are defined in the table 1 in the appendix.  
2. Sukuk: challenges and defaults: 
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In the case of default the Sukuk investors’ rights differ to conventional bonds. In the case of 
a conventional bond default, the issuer can be sued for any missing interest by the trustee of 
the bond, who acts on behalf of the bondholders. However, with Sukuk the trustee 
represents the issuer and a special purpose vehicle (SPV). In order to eliminate the risk of 
the SPV having no benefit in enforcing against the underlying issuer to pay the missed rental 
payment in the case of default; the SPV delegates all the trustee functions, except for the 
core holding of the asset, to a professional trustee. This results in a similar trustee used in 
conventional bonds; who monitors the issuance until maturity.  (Mohammed. 2014) 
Additionally, for asset-backed Sukuk, in the case of default, the certificate holders, in 
principle, have resource to the underlying assets provided that all the legal requirements to 
become a legitimate owner of the assets are established. Consequently, the risk faced by 
the investors is a market risk, resulting from the risk of capital loss which can occur from a 
drop in prices of the underlying assets and/or default of the lessee on rental payments. 
(Lukonga, 2015) 
However, Sukuk have been said to possess higher default risk when compared to 
conventional bonds. This is due to the Islamic prohibition of debt trading; thus making any 
rescheduling of debt for higher mark-up forbidden. Additionally, Sukuk have been suggested 
to be limited with regard to liquidity as supposed to conventional bonds, as they, as Sukuk, 
represent certificates of ownership. This implies that in the case of default, the opportunity 
for  Sukuk holders to retrieve  their initial investments is very limited; compared to 
conventional debt obligations which are very liquid .(Zahamal, 2010, Mohd Noor & Shahimi, 
2013) 
 
3. Sukuk and stability: 
Similar to the bond market, the dynamism of the Sukuk market also contributes towards 
enhancing financial stability through its lengthening of the duration of debt; as well as 
promoting the expansion of inter-regional investment flows. With regards to financial 
institutions, Sukuk enhance their stability by providing them with improved portfolio 
diversifications and liquidity. Sukuk acts as liquidity and risk management tools for banks 
and Islamic Financial institutions, as they enable “the active management of designated 
asset portfolio due to greater control over asset status, as well as the isolation of certain 
assets in order to make them self-financing at a fair market rate”. (Jobst, 2007, p31) 
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Similarly, with regards to individual investors, Sukuk are viewed to complement the existing 
conventional ABS paradigm, through providing an alternative investment product as well as 
broadening the pricing spectrum, as Sukuk are priced as a result of real market valuation of 
the underlying assets; whereas bonds are priced given the credit rating of the issuer. (Jobst, 
2007) 
The risk-sharing feature or what is generally referred to as the Profit and Loss mechanism 
(PLS) of Sukuk makes them a convenient funding instrument for infrastructure; as returns 
are linked to profit instead of capital. PLS represents  a key element of Sukuk structuring; it’s 
a mutual transaction in which one collection of property rights is exchanged for another, 
through the purchase and resale of goods as well as the supplying of services; for fees 
based on an agreed upon contract.  This implies that both parties share production, 
transportation, and different market risks involved; thereby, enabling all parties to enter into a 
sharing contract that helps reduce the risk of income volatility This helps provide a balance 
of wealth in the system, which protects it from collapsing.  Therefore, as financial integration 
is increasing along with the internationalisation of Islamic finance, growth in the Sukuk 
market is set to contribute towards a more holistic growth process whilst enhancing financial 
stability as the two are mutually reinforcing. (Aziz, 2014) . 
 Infrastructure projects require complex legal arrangements to insure the sharing of the risks 
involved as well as the proper distribution of payoffs; as revenue are usually generated years 
later after the initiation of these projects.  The majority of conventional infrastructure projects 
consist of distinct equity and debt components; which concentrates risk in the equity tranche 
whilst making the contracts more complex. In addition to limitations when dealing with 
unforeseen but frequent events such as delays in revenue generation; Sukuk’s design 
enables the broader spread of risk as all investors share risks in the same manner. Sukuk 
also possess the advantage of their flexibility with regards to the element of time, as returns 
are tied and generated according to the performance of the underlying assets rather than to 
fixed schedules; suggesting that they could be issued at different maturities. (Kammer et al, 
2015; Ehlers, 2014). 
Sukuk distinctive feature lies in their flexibility, as they can be structured according to the 
requirements and preferences of issuers and investors. (Alawi & Al Quati, 2014) Additionally, 
Sukuk encourage genuine transactions through which more business activities could take 
place as they are based on real, identifiable, existing assets. This results in the development 
of a stable and sound economy; founded on real assets and productive activities as opposed 
to artificial paper based transactions.  
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Analysis in this paper will focus on stability elements such as maturity, sectorial allocation of 
Sukuk issuance, Sukuk structures and the underlying collateral used in Islamic 
securitisation. Both Maturity and Sectorial view gives a valuable insight as to what purpose 
the Sukuk as currently being used; which allows to compare the theoretical 
recommendations of usage vis-à-vis implementations in reality. On the other hand, Sukuk 
structures and underlying collateral used in securitisation are also interesting, as structures 
have become more sophisticated, tailored to the various needs and components of the 
market. 
For a financial stable environment, long term maturity bonds are favoured along with projects 
that support development and productivity growth such as infrastructure and manufacturing. 
On the other hand focus on the financial sector is regarded as instable. Minsky (1992) , 
explains  this instability as a natural result to the normal functioning of capital economy due 
to expensive capital assets and a complex, sophisticated financial system. As a result to this 
complexity, the financial institutions are capable of a number of behavioural trends; which 
depends upon institutional relations, the structure of financial linkages and the history of the 
economy. (Minsky, 1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sukuk in the GCC: An analysis III.
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1. Sukuk market development 
 
      
Sources : IIFM 2014 
 
Generally, Sukuk issuances have continued to rise over the years. Yet, in 2008, the Sukuk 
market witnessed a sizable decline; as the former was impacted by the deterioration in the 
wholesale money markets as well as U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. Sukuk issuances 
plunged by about 35% on an annualized basis to US$15.2 billion in 2008; while issuances of 
conventional instruments tumbled down by about 80%, collapsing to just under US$387 
billion during the same period. (Jobst, 2010) This decline was primarily notable in the Gulf 
Corporation Council (GCC) region, as the Sukuk market declined by 59% during 2008 
compared to 2007, as it lacked the supportive economic environment. Additionally, the 
region was impacted by the troubles faced in the regional real estate sector; which was 
perturbed by the slowdown of global trade and foreign direct investment.  (Moody’s Investors 
services, Hijazi, 2009). 
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Figure 2: Global Sukuk Issuance regional Break up 
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Figure 2 Sources :MIFC/IIFM 2015 
 
But, in 2009, the market picked up its growth pace following the gradual normalization of 
credit conditions, accompanied by emerging demand which helped stabilize the primary 
Sukuk market. (Jobst, 2010, MIFC, 2015) The same year also witnessed an increase in 
cross boarder activity, in the Sukuk market, leading to the rise in the number of issuances in 
foreign currency Sukuk particularly in USD. The cross-border activity was reinforced as 
listings on key stock exchanges increased, notably in Europe’s stock exchanges specifically 
the London Stock Exchange and Luxembourg Stock Exchange. (MIFC, 2015) 
However, when reviewing the trend of Sukuk issuance in the GCC; it appears that the impact 
of the financial crisis on the Sukuk market lasted up to 2011, as issuances were relatively 
low during the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
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Figure 4: Sukuk Issuance Trend in the GCC 
 
Source: Rasameel, 2014 
 
Nevertheless, the GCC’s attraction to Sukuk and Islamic bonds is evident. This attraction is 
accredited to the extreme change in the Gulf’s Debt capital Markets, as well as being 
underpinned by extremely strong sovereign balance sheets and a demonstrated willingness 
by governments of the region to support key issuers.  Debt Capital Markets in the Gulf have 
changed dramatically over the last few years. In 2003, the worth of the Middle Eastern Debt 
Capital market was estimated at 2.7 Billion USD, increased to 38.6 Billion USD in 2013. 
Many of the Gulf banks such as Qatar National Bank ,National Bank of Abu Dhabi, Emirates-
NBD and First Gulf Bank are playing leading roles in arranging bond deals not only in the 
region but also further afield, as they are starting to compete with the large international 
banks. This is attributed to the fact that at a macro-level, regional economies have shown 
consistent growth through several global economic cycles, in addition to becoming stronger 
as a result of diversification, as well as building strong trade and financial linkages with Asia. 
(Gifferty 2014)  
However, during the period of 2014 - 2015, the GCC’s issuances were impacted by the 
lower oil prices and lower export earnings. Sukuk issuances for the first quarter of 2015 
declined to USD18.7bln from USD24.2bln at the end of 2014. Concerns related to exchange 
rate volatility in emerging markets, influenced by expectations about monetary policy in 
advanced economies contributed to the decline. (MIFC,2015) Yet, the GCC’s Sukuk market 
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future outlook is promising. This is due to the growing utilization of Islamic financial solutions 
across the key markets such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar; to finance the largescale 
development projects and infrastructure spending planned. (RSF, 2013) 
 
2. Sukuk Stabilizing elements review: 
Given the important association of economic and financial stability to currency and maturity 
mismatches; it is important to ask to what extent Sukuk maturity dates, the development of 
domestic Sukuk and international markets, Sukuk industry breakdown and the underlying 
collateral used in the Sukuk securitization have to impacting financial vulnerabilities in the 
GCC region. 
Sukuk are classified in to two main structures, asset based and asset backed. Asset based 
issuances are generally referred to as Islamic bonds; whilst assets backed securities are 
referred to as securitizations.  The majority of Sukuk issued in the GCC are asset backed 
with only a limited number of Sharia compliant securitization transactions. 
 
2.1. Sukuk duration: Short term vs Long term Issuences 
IIMF(2015) 
Short term (<12 
Months), 
285,242, 43% Long term (>12 
Months), 
382,816, 57% 
Figure 5: Comparaison between Global Short term Sukuk 
and Longer term Sukuk (Jan 2001-July2014, USD Millions) 
Short term (<12 Months) Long term (>12 Months)
 Safiyah I Taoual    
12 
 
Global appetite for short term Sukuk (less than 12 months) is evident in the GCC region 
along with  the long term issuances (more than 12 months) .The share of short-term Sukuk 
market is 43%  (USD 285 billion) while the longer term Sukuk issuances is 57% (USD 382 
billion) of the global Sukuk market.  
The trend towards issuing shorter term Sukuk is rising and is mainly driven by sovereign 
issuers via central banks issuances; particularly for liquidity purposes as well as supporting 
monetary policy implementation.  This is similar to conventional bonds as the maturity 
profiles for the GCC Central Bank Local Issuance for both 2012 and 2014, indicated that the 
percentage of issues under 1 year represented 78% and 65.05%, consecutively, of all GCC 
central bank issuances (Markaz, 2014). 
Market liquidity is regarded as a main concern for Islamic Banks in particular, as the 
availability of Sharia compliant funds is limited, when compared to conventional ones.  
Additionally, the lack of properly structured and easily transferable instruments, as well as 
the obligation of Islamic Banks to maintain higher cash reserves5 compared to conventional 
banks; increase the necessity of liquidity.(Archer, Ahmed & Karim, 2014).  
Governments in the GCC consider Sukuk essential for developing and strengthening of the 
Islamic interbank market. The Central Bank of Bahrain is an eminent example, through its 
regular issuances of short-term Sukuk in Bahraini dinars. (Kusuma & Silva, 2014)  
Additionally, with the decrease in bank liquidity, increase in volatility, and the increase in 
demand for public debt; the issuance of Sukuk has become more attractive particularly for 
cooperate borrowers in the region.   
The phenomena of favouring short term borrowing in the GCC, has been explained by  
Broner  et al, (2013) suggesting that the former is due to supply-side factors; arguing that 
investors, in emerging economies in particular, charge a higher risk premium on long-term 
bonds when compared to the short-term bonds, making it cheaper to borrow in the shorter 
term. Furthermore, during periods of financial unsettling the cost of borrowing long term 
increases significantly, prompting countries to diminish the amount of long-term borrowing. 
Thus, shorter-term Sukuk have the potential of providing a better yield to investors who have 
recently been affected by the decline in crude prices which eroded revenue for both 
                                               
5
 In ISF, banks have real ownership as deposits are determined through real savings implying that 
there is no credit created without backing it by real savings. Moreover, profits are generated through 
profit creating activities that generate wealth; this differs to the conventional system where credit 
expansion has no direct link to real capital. (Askari et al, 2010) 
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government institutions and bank; all whilst managing interest-rate risk for these institutions 
through reducing duration (Solovieva, 2015;Broner et al, 2013; IIFM, 2015). 
However, although short term Sukuk present a solution to satisfying short term liquidity 
requirements; the short term maturity trend  has its risks and can  pose several challenges 
for banks, financial institutions, pension funds and insurance companies which are trying to 
match durations of their liabilities in a Sharia compliant manner. 
In general, the excessive reliance on short term funding, by financial institutions, has been 
viewed as the root of fragility of the financial system and the catalyst of the current financial 
crisis; as many underestimated the probability of a macro shock. In addition, financial 
institutions were heavily exposed to refinancing risk in wholesale debt markets, resulting in 
externalities which affect other institutions exposed to short funding. Yet, the rising short-
term Sukuk trend can be viewed as an undesirable phenomenon. Kindlberger (2005) argued 
that heavy reliance on short term financing, particularly with regards to infrastructure, is 
undesirable as they can be perceived as  a sign of distress, and a seasonal tightness which 
precipitates a crash; whereas long-term financing is central to enabling development 
because that allows for infrastructure and industrial investment. 
On the other hand, the longer term Sukuk have increased in popularity in the GCC region, 
particularly within in the corporate sector.  As we will assess later, the GCC have the 
distinctive feature of its corporate sector being far more active in Sukuk issuances when 
compared to sovereigns, partly because of the strong fiscal position of some countries in the 
region, and thus governments do not necessarily need funding from the capital market. Yet, 
though long term Sukuk issuances are increasing in the region, Sukuk issues of 25 years 
can be described as negligible as the majority of long term Sukuk maturity dates are no 
longer than 10 years.  The only 30 year Sukuk from GCC so far was USD 1 Billion issued by 
the Saudi Electricity Company in April 2013. (MIFC, 2015) 
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2.2. Issuence Currencies: International vs Domestic Sukuk issuances: 
 
Sources: IIFM 2015 
 
Table 2: International vs Domestic Sukuk Issuances in the GCC (Jan 2001-July2014) 
 International Sukuk 
Issuance 
Domestic Sukuk 
Issuances 
GCC Countries Number of 
Issues 
Amount in 
USD 
Millions 
Number of 
issues 
Amount in 
USD 
Millions 
Bahrain 94 6,830 218  9,124 
Kuwait 13 2,127 1 332 
Oman 0 0 1 130 
Qatar 10 8,935 9 13,115 
Saudi Arabia 30 21,542 43 33,538 
United Arab Emirates 68 45,986 14 8,251 
Total 215 85,420 290 64,490 
 
The domestic market represents Sukuk issued in local currencies, whereas International 
issuances are those usually issued in U.S dollars. The large portion of domestic issuances 
(43%) serves as an indication to the functioning of the Islamic financial system in the region 
International 
Sukuk Issuance, 
85,420, 57% 
Domestic Sukuk 
Issuance, 64,490, 
43% 
Figure 6: Sukuk Issuances  in GCC countries: 
International vs Domestic Million USD (Jan 2001-
July2014) 
International Sukuk Issuance Domestic Sukuk Issuance
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and its development. Leading countries in domestic offerings were Saudi Arabia ($33,538 
Million) and Qatar ($13,115 Million).  The raising of funds via the issuance of Sukuk, requires 
the demand of investors who can either solely invest in Islamic instruments or who have a 
general preference of Islamic finance compared to conventional financing. This implies the 
need and importance of developing the Islamic financial sector as Sukuk cannot develop 
alone; thus suggesting the need for the establishment of basic preconditions for securities 
market as well as a strong legal and taxation framework in order for the domestic Sukuk 
market to operate effectively. (Kusuma & Silva, 2014)  Hence, the development of a well-
functioning Sukuk market requires an effective supporting Islamic financial ecosystem; 
current trends imply that the GCC countries have and are developing the required enabling 
environment as well as a genuine motivation for the use of nonconventional instruments 
such as Sukuk. 
Nevertheless, international issuances represent the majority of the GCC issuances with 57% 
of all issuances. With Bahrain leading in the number of issues (94 issues worth $ 6830 
Million); whereas the UAE leads in the amount of its issuances in the international Sukuk 
markets with ($ 45,986 Million/68 deals) as it has deepened its financial markets over the 
past decade.  
Issuances in domestic currencies are viewed to reduce the overall financial systems’ 
vulnerabilities to external shocks. Similar to conventional bonds; Sukuk are considered to be 
less likely to default on local currency in comparison to foreign currency.  On the other hand, 
international issuances, particularly ones focused on the short-term paper, enhances 
systematic risk through undermining the role of monetary policy in the region. During the 
crisis a large part of government debt and bonds issued as USD-denominated international 
bonds, faced challenges as international markets dried out and bank liquidity diminished. 
(Kern, 2014) 
However, although domestic Sukuk may be more stable, they can be criticised for their 
narrow focus on the domestic investors in comparison to international markets. International 
markets not only provide access to new types of investors, but also a supportive legal 
framework. Issuers are able to select and use the legal framework, in a jurisdiction that 
supports the creation of SPVs and issuance of Sukuk that suits them. Many of the Sukuk 
contracts are enforced in internationally recognized jurisdictions such as the US or the UK. 
Yet, in the event of default, challenges may arise as Sukuk are asset based; particularly with 
regards to obtaining local enforcement of a foreign court’s decision because of the location 
of the assets. (Kusuma & Silva, 2014).  
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Thus, in order to fully exploit the potential of Sukuk in the GCC, a holistic approach is 
needed to facilitate the development of domestic markets as well as facilitate the access and 
operation in the international markets. 
 
2.3. Sukuk issuers Industry Breakdown: 
The industry breakup of the Sukuk issuers in the GCC market provides a valuable insight as 
to what purpose these instruments are used; and whether they are utilised effectively in a 
manner insuring and enhancing systemic stability and development in the region.  
GCC economies are characterised by the robustness of their reserves surplus, meagre debt 
levels and strong credit profiles. Yet, these economies suffer from their high dependence on 
oil revenues. This situation, implies a high and significant volatility to variations in 
international oil prices. (Markaz, 2015)  
Figure 7: Debt /Sukuk in GCC 2005-2015
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Markaz Analysis(2015) 
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GCC countries have the distinctive feature of corporate issuers being far more active than 
sovereigns, partly because of the strong fiscal position of some countries in the region. 
Therefore governments do not necessarily need funding from the capital markets. This is 
evident from the last 10 year forecast (Figure 7), as corporate issuances have surpassed 
sovereign issuances for most years except for 2005, when Sukuk were just taking off in the 
region, and 2009 after the credit crisis of 2007-2008.  The collapse of asset and commodity 
prices and the freezing of financial markets, resulted in the sharp credit slowdown in the 
GCC .This slowdown prompted forceful reactions by the GCC authorities which included 
fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and exceptional measures to support the financial system 
which included the issuances of sovereign Sukuk to support the region’s economies. 
(Rocha, Arvai & Farazi, 2011) 
The government’s presence in the debt/Sukuk has a dual impact, positive and negative. A 
strong government presence in domestic debt markets; can in the case of conventional 
bonds, contribute to the establishment of risk-free yield curves, which stand as a benchmark 
for private sector issuances. (Jeaneau & Tovar, 2007) Although issuances of Sukuk can be 
said to not abide by this rule, as they do not represent debt certificates with a financial claim 
to cash flows receiving guaranteed returns from a loan; the lack of sovereign presence has 
been regarded as one of the underlying factors in the slow development of the Sukuk market 
in the region; as the later can potentially create a pricing benchmark for potential corporate 
issuances.   
Additionally, the limited amount of  information from  private sources, with regards to  
securitized assets, in many Sukuk transactions also hinders fair market valuation (Jobst, 
2013; RFS, 2013) However, as Sukuk do not pay interest and returns are linked to the profit 
generated through real transactions derived from an underlying real business risk; viewing 
government issuances as a benchmark will not necessary be useful as each project is 
unique in its underlying risk and consequently its return structure.  
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Source: Bloomberg (2015) 
 
Detailed industry breakdown of Sukuk issuers in the GCC, indicates the strong presence of 
the financial sector.  The industry breakdown compiled by Bloomberg for the period of 2005-
2015, also confirms the weak sovereign presence in the Sukuk market with 13.45% of all 
issuances; whereas the financial sector represents 48% of all issuances.  
The strong financial presence along with the weak presence of industries with strong 
productivity enhancing potential such as Communications, Industrial Utilities and Transport; 
can pose a challenge to the development and growth potential in the region. The last crisis 
resulted in the loss of trust in the financial industry and their motives. This leads to the 
question whether banks (particularly conventional ones) in the region are utilizing the Sukuk 
as a means to take advantage of the funds rich region.  
Although theoretically Sukuk are considered valuable potential particularly with regards to 
infrastructure, the GCC has witnessed a minimalistic number of project financed via Sukuk 
issuances.  The year 2012 saw the launch of the world’s first project based Sukuk by Saudi 
oil giant Aramco. In collaboration with French oil company Total, Aramco launched a Saudi 
Arabian Riyal (SAR) denominated Sukuk worth USD 1 billion in order to finance construction 
of the Jubail oil refinery. The issuance was positively accepted by the market and was 
followed by a similar Sukuk of bigger size, this time in collaboration with another international 
Basic Materials, 6.42% 
Consumer Prod/Svcs, 
10.43% 
Financial, 47.89% 
Government, 
13.45% 
Industrial, 6.00% 
Oil/Gas/Electricity, 
14.25% 
Tech/Comm, 1.56% 
Figure 8: Industry Breakdown Sukuk Issuences 2005-2015 
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giant Dow Chemicals, to fund construction of the Sadara chemical complex in 2013.  (IIMF, 
2015) 
Sukuk analysis criteria by Standard and Poor’s rating agency (2012) suggested the following 
ratings for five of the GCC’s main infrastructure Sukuk issuances:   
Table 3: Rating of major infrastructure Sukuk (S&P ratings, 2012) 
Sukuk  Rating 
Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk Co.. AA  6 
Aby Dhabi National Energy Co. PJSC . TAQA Sukuk A- 7 
PETRoNAs Global Sukuk Ltd A- 
Nomura Aircraft leasing Sukuk  BBB+8 
Axiata Group Berhad BBB- 
 
The ratings above demonstrate that the Islamically funded infrastructure is regarded as 
stable; as its rating fluctuate between having a strong capacity to pay back any financial 
obligation AAA, and BBB which suggest that they are in a financially stable position to repay 
their obligations. 
The emerging presence of industries with productivity enhancing potential such as 
Communications, Industrial Utilities and Transport; in the Sukuk market represents a 
promising potential. The market outlook published by Al Markaz Research (2015) for the 
GCC, as indicated in the table below (Figure 9), reviews the overall market view with regards 
to factors such as Oil markets, Earnings Growth potential, Valuation Attraction, Economic 
factors and Market liquidity. The GCC market outlook 2015 shows the strong correlation 
between developments in the oil sector and the general economic environment in the region.  
Thus, with market expectations proving to be neutral or negative for most of the GCC; Sukuk 
have the potential to provide both short as well as long term financing. Additionally, with 
market liquidity anticipated to be negative in the region (Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain), short 
term Sukuk provides the potential to resolve this issue.  
                                               
6
 AA: According to S&P ratings “an obligor is rated 'AA' has very strong capacity to meet its financial 
commitments; differing from the highest-rated obligors only to a small degree.” (S&P, 2012, p7) 
7
 A : “Obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the 
obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is still strong”.(S&P,2012,p7) 
8
 BBB An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits “adequate protection parameters. However, adverse 
economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the 
obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation”. (S&P , 2012,p7)  
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Figure 9:  GCC Market Outlook 2015 
Markaz Research(2015) 
2.4. Sukuk structure and underlying risks: 
The growing sophistication and flexibility of Sukuk structures, has become a key factor 
behind its growing acceptance; as they can be customised to meet the requirements and 
preferences of specific target markets. Over the years, numerous structures have 
developed.  Al Ijarah (Lease agreement) and Murabaha (Cost plus sales agreements) Sukuk 
are considered the most prominent Sukuk structures due to their general acceptance by 
diverse Sharia boards as well as their rather simplistic contractual term.  Yet, there has been 
a development of more complex structures, for investment purposes, that involve forms of 
partnership such as Musharakah (partnership agreement in a specific projector activity) and 
Mudaraba9 (.(Hijazi, 2009) .  
The lack of standardization and different interpretation of Sharia Law with regards to Sukuk 
structures has raised challenges concerning the comparability and pricing of these 
securities. The different structures make the investors’ decisions to replace Sukuk from one 
issuer with another, for a credit reason or otherwise, not straightforward like in conventional 
securities; thus making it difficult to recognise the risks they are taking on. (Kusuma & Silva, 
2014 ; Lukonga, 2015)  Yet, in order to avoid these risks investors usually seek products 
with general agreement to be Sharia compliant. The favoured structure is Al Ijarah Sukuk 
(lease-based Sukuk) due to its simplicity. Additionally it is approved by all Sharia boards, so 
it is unlikely to be affected by any changes in Islamic interpretation. The difference in the 
                                               
9
 A partnership agreement where the funds to finance a project are supplied by the provider of capital; 
while the entrepreneur offers labour and expertise. Profits ratios are agreed upon and are shared 
accordingly. However, in the case on loss, all losses are borne by the owner of capital; as the liability 
of the entrepreneur is restricted only to his time and effort.. 
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underlying structures and their robustness was evident during the 2007-2008 crisis, as the 
rates of defaults between different structured differed. 
Sukuk Al Ijarah represented the most prominent structure for GCC issues in the last few 
years. Prior to the real estate boom in the GCC, the majority of Sukuk issuances were either 
Mudaraba or Musharakah; which were used in financing business activities. However, as the 
real estate market boomed in the region (Dubai in particular) issuances of Ijarah Sukuk 
increased based on real estate related assets; as they are considered rather secure with 
better risk profile compared to partnership agreements such as Murabaha. (Goud, 2010)   
The crisis of 2007-2008, witnessed several Sukuk defaults in the GCC region. Analysing 
these cases proves to be particularly interesting as theoretically, Sukuk are similar to equity 
as they are based on the sharing of both profits and loss (PLS). Therefore, there should be 
no question of default, in what can be considered as a limited liability/ equity like instrument; 
along with access to the underlying asset since holders are considered legal owners. 
(Winjnber & Zaheer, 2013)  
10  
Source (RSF, Rasameel, 2013) 
Analysis of the 2007-2008 crisis, suggested that the most prominent type of Sukuk defaults 
were Sukuk Al Mudarabah (38%) Sukuk Al Ijarah (30%) and Sukuk Al Musharakah (19%). 
                                               
10
 A hybrid Sukuk has a more complex structure as it adopts multiple components within the structure 
such as using element of Wakala and Mudarabah Sukuk together. 
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Figure 10: Structural breakdown of International Sukuk 
Defaulted/Restructured during 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(IIMF databse, 2015) 
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Eminent defaults included Kuwaiti Islamic Investment Company, which announced its failure 
to pay biannual return on its USD100 million Sukuk. This was followed by the default of the 
Saudi Saad Group, which failed to pay periodic rental payments on its USD650 million 
Sukuk, issued in 2007.  In November 2009, the Government of Dubai announced its failure 
to make payments on one of the largest Sukuk issued, Al Nakheel Sukuk of USD3.5 billion 
just few weeks before its maturity.  However, this was prevented by a USD 10 Billion bailout 
package from the Government of the Abu Dhabi. (Zaheer &Van Wijnbergen, 2013) 
The defaults proved interesting due to the use of different structures, as well as the fact that 
many of these Sukuk were asset-based rather than asset-backed. Being asset-based, meant 
that Sukuk holders could only require the originator to purchase the underlying assets; as 
well as having an unsecured debt claim against the originator from the payment of the 
purchase price after exercising their rights under the relevant purchase undertaking. Thus, 
arguably resulting in an unexpected credit risk to many of the investors; who believed that 
they would have access to the underlying assets. 
However, in 2007-2008, as the economic situation worsened, payment obligations could no 
longer be met. Many international investors faced difficulties transferring ownership since in 
some GCC countries it is not permissible under applicable local laws or the transferring 
process is complicated and an expensive legal and regulatory process. (IIFM, 2013; 
Lukonga, 2015) 
The main issue that occurred was that under the United Arab Emirates (UAE) legislation 
(Dubai in particular) leasehold interests are not regarded as real rights, or property rights; 
implying that they are not sale agreements were rights can be transferred.  Thus, as leases 
are not viewed as real property rights; they are considered to be “unregistered personal 
contractual rights binding the parties as opposed to rights attached to the land in question”.  
(Salah, 2010, p.32) 
The Al Nakheel Sukuk default shocked the Sukuk markets around the world, as it was one of 
the first billion dollar Sukuk on the verge of default. Issuance of the Nakheel Sukuk was 
based on Al Ijarah Sukuk structure; similar to the conventional lease-and-lease-back 
transaction. The underlying tangible assets in the Nakheel deal were the land, buildings, and 
other property known as DWF South and Crescent Lands at Dubai Waterfront.  The project 
requiring financing was the plan to construct a “city twice the size of Hong Kong Island, with 
skyscrapers for 1.5 million residents, all ringed by a 75 km canal at Dubai Waterfront. The 
aggregate amount for the entire lease period of 50 years was paid by Nakheel SPV to 
Nakheel Holdings” (Salah, 2010, p22).  
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Nakheel SPV operated as the trustee for and on behalf of the Sukuk holders; with each 
Sukuk certificate representing an undivided beneficial ownership of the trust assets held by 
the SPV. However, analysis conducted by Salah (2010) of the Nakheel Sukuk, shows the 
complexity of its legal structure. Initially, Sukuk  holders positions were secure  and 
sufficiently protected; as the various Nakheel holdings engaged in a co-obligor guarantee, 
which meant that each holding guaranteed the payment obligations of their own and each 
other’s. Proprietary rights were also established in order to provide the holders with property 
law protections. 
When Al Nakheel Sukuk were issued, there was no mention of the formal registration 
required for leasehold rights. Hence, Sukuk holders in this case, did not acknowledge the 
UAE and Dubai’s complex financial legislation; which considerably impacted on the legal 
options Sukuk holders faced. (Salah, 2010).  As a result, the defaulted cases in the GCC 
exposed what can be regarded as inconsistencies between theoretical principles of Sukuk 
products and actual structures; as well as limitations in investors understanding of risks 
involved.    
Yet, it can be argued defaults do not undermine the stability element of the Sukuk, as 
holders still had link to the underlying assets. Yet this was hindered by the lack of 
transparency of legal clauses and the rules and regulations of the issuing countries. Thus, 
highlighting that investors’ rights depend on local laws and the jurisdiction where these 
underlying assets were domiciled, as well as on the strength of legal rights in the country 
where the collateral is likely to be disputed. The reclaim of portion of ownership, which 
enables investors to take control over the securitized assets and their operations, was 
hindered by complex legal and tax proceedings as well as prominent restrictions in the GCC 
on foreign ownership of locally domiciled assets. (Jobst, 2013, Lukonga, 2015).  
However, the main issue with the problematic Sukuk was that they did not follow the pure 
Islamic notion of transparency when presenting the clauses in the main contracts. 
Islamically, there should be no discrepancies and loopholes which can deprive the Sukuk 
investors of the rights promised in the offering circulars. Additionally, Winjnber & Zaheer 
(2013, p2) suggested that in most cases, “the problems can be traced back to clauses and 
structures that made the Sukuk more like conventional bonds”. These clauses included 
sections to ascertain the return on capital with some promissory notes or guarantees by the 
originators or third parties; as well as credit enhancement agreement. Such features made 
Sukuk very similar to conventional bonds which pay periodic interest and a face value at 
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maturity. As a result, introducing conventional traits put Sukuk in a position in which there 
were eligible to default just like conventional bonds. 
Therefore, strict adherence to Sharia11 principles of ownership, transparency and risk 
sharing would have considerably reduced default cases as well as eased the restructuring 
process; as Sharia law implies a clear allocation of property rights to investors in the case of 
distress. (Winjnber & Zaheer, 2013). Adhering to these principles would have ensured Sukuk 
a much resilient position. 
Nevertheless, it’s important to note that fluctuations and failures in the Sukuk market cannot 
be viewed inseparably to the global economic downturn during the period of 2007-2008; as 
well as the collapse of the real estate market which escalated from the US subprime market 
crisis.  Therefore, Sukuk cannot be treated and expected to react in isolation to the external 
economic environment; as they are subject to the impact of general economic conditions. 
Similarly, Sukuk are exposed to sectorial and industry specific risks related to whatever it is 
being used to finance and if that sector or company experiences a downturn. (Goud, 2010) 
 
2.5.  Underlying collateral Islamic securitization: 
Securitization’s main advantage lies in the pooling of idiosyncratic risk and promoting risk 
sharing across a wide base of investments and investors; as well as transforming assets 
subject to liquidity and credit risks, such as leases, mortgages or small enterprise loans into 
tradable instruments with much lower credit risk. (CGFS, 2007) However, the credit crisis of 
2007/2008, has prompted a less compassionate view with regards to securitisation.  
Particular scrutiny has been on the multi-layered agency problems at the various stages of 
the securitisation process; starting with the origination of the loan to the sale, warehousing 
and securitisation as well as the role of the credit rating agencies in the process. The multi-
layered ownership structure is often described by the means of an inflating balloon which fills 
up with new assets. As the balloon expands, the banks search for new assets to fill the 
balloon a well as seeking borrowers to lend to in the meantime. (Shin, 2009) 
Yet, the structure of Islamic securitization (asset backed Sukuk) impedes the occurrence of 
such a situation, as Islamic financial principles require that the end investor has total access 
or ownership of rights; when conventionally there are numerous layers of ownership. This 
                                               
11
 Sharia Law: Islamic Jurisdiction from the holy Quran and Sayings of the Prophet  
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feature limits the possibility of a security being traded multiply, which could have cascading 
outcomes in the case of liquidation. (Askari, 2012) 
GCC countries have a large potential for Islamic securitization. Islamic securitization has 
taken a particular keen interest in the real estate sector; as the former is viewed as a real 
tangible asset class, on which the Islamic financial structures can be easily based. Real 
estate has had a fundamental role in the Islamic finance industry since the 1990s. Islamic 
property investments debuted in the residential housing sector then proceeded to 
commercial real estate and commercial property investments.  
In the GCC, most securitised assets are residential mortgages, consumer finance and auto 
loans; with asset diversification anticipated to increase in the future as the Sukuk market 
develops further. During the period of 2003-2013, the majority of Islamic securitised 
transactions originated from the real estate market, counting for 4 out of the total 7 Islamic 
securitisation deals during that period.  These real-estate backed transactions, were 
transacted in the UAE, KSA and Qatar, along with the single sovereign Islamic securitization 
structured in Qatar in 2003. In 2013, Kuwait emerged the first innovative Islamic transaction 
backed from the retail industry. Meanwhile, the single financial institution to issue Islamic 
securitised instruments was the Islamic Development Bank of Saudi Arabia (IDB) in 2003, as 
the only bank to issue in the region, potential for this type of transactions is evident 
particularly with regards to liquidity and developmental projects. (RSF, 2013) 
 Safiyah I Taoual    
26 
 
 
Sources: (RSF, Rasameel,  2014)) 
 
When observing the underlying collateral generating the cash flow of the Sukuk; it can be 
concluded that the most utilised collateral class is that related to the real estate sector. The 
two most commonly used assets during the period of 2003- 2013 were lease receivables 
(43%) and residential mortgages (29%).  The collateral underlying the Sukuk securitization, 
represents a crucial element with regards to the stability aspect of the Sukuk. Adhering to 
Islamic principles, suggests that collateral assets must be Sharia compliant, this means 
collateral cannot be debt, or based on any unethical, exploitable, speculative or any 
prohibited activities. (Jobst, 2013). Therefore, real estate is viewed to be one of the favoured 
assets classes for Islamic investors as property clearly meets the asset focus of Sukuk 
transactions. As a result, the majority of underlying collateral is real estate related  such as 
mortgage backed securities, lease receivables, and property lease receivables which are 
backed by the payments on loans secured by residential or commercial real estate (Lucipa, 
1998). 
The crisis of 2007-2008, witnessed the leading role of securitization and the real estate 
market. Thus, the stability of the real estate sector has been one of the prominent topics 
discussed during and after the latest financial crash; with a widespread argument suggesting 
that many periods of financial instability in the past were linked to equity or real estate price 
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boom-bust cycles. Consequently, large asset price increases are often regarded as an 
indication for a bubble in the making; while large price decreases are viewed as an indication 
of a bubble burst (Helbing, 2003). During the 2007-2008 crisis, the GCC witnessed a sharp 
fall in its stock prices, which resulted from the burst of its real estate bubble as well as the 
region’s openness to international markets.  
Property markets have several distinctive characteristics when compared with other types of 
assets. The main one being its locality element as that the supply of property is intensively 
local. Additionally, its flexibility with regards to delivering new real estate properties, is rather 
limited as the former is constrained by the length of the planning and construction phases. 
Furthermore, real estate market liquidity is constrained by the high transaction costs. 
(Helbing, 2003) The real estate market is widely used as collateral in securitization contracts 
as short sales in the industry are not feasible.  
However, the real estate market possesses several inherent risks as investments in the 
sector rely upon numerous factors, including the type of property as well as independent 
assessment and review parties.  (IFSB, 2009)  In the short run, property prices are more 
likely to diverge from their long-term expectations and forecasts; as fluctuations can arise not 
only as result from cyclical movements in economic fundamentals, interest rates and the risk 
premiums, but also as an outcome of the intrinsic traits of the property market itself. On the 
other hand, for Sukuk based on real estate, risk is likely to be greater for properties under 
development in comparison to completed ones. (IFSB, 2009; Zhu, 2003) 
These factors can pose a challenge with regards to the stability of the real estate sector. 
Additionally, collateral such as rental agreements and leases, inhere risks of their own. 
Rental agreements, mortgage payments and leases are strongly correlated to factors based 
on economic and demographic conditions. (Raja Abd Aziz, 2010) Rents can be very sticky 
as a result of the use of long-term rental contracts. (Helbing, 2003)  
Furthermore, the high reliance on mortgage based collateral is also problematic as mortgage 
loans default correlation is relatively high which represents a substantial systematic 
component. Yet, though mortgage loans typically have a lower default probability, defaults in 
the mortgage market usually come together as the overall national economy falls into 
distress. (Zhu, 2003) This high correlation is particularly important in the case of Sukuk, due 
to the lack of diversification in the types of underlying assets; as the fact that Sukuk were 
biased towards one sector (real estate) made them heavily exposed to the global economic 
downturn. 
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 Findings & Conclusions: IV.
The increase of regional focus and attraction to Sukuk and Islamic bonds, by both financial 
and non-financial institutions, in the GCC is evident. The Islamic instruments are being 
utilised both for shorter term liquidity purposes, aimed at strengthening the Islamic banking 
sector as well as long term issuances. Yet, the heavy reliance on short term utilisation raises 
some concerns; particularly as shorter term issuances can be perceived as a sign of 
distress, and a seasonal tightness which precipitates a crash; whereas long-term financing is 
central to enabling development because that allows for infrastructure and industrial 
investment. Thus, growth potential is available for longer term Sukuk issuances as they are 
arguably more stability enhancing. 
The analysis suggested that there is a tendency to issue in US dollars; as international 
markets prove to not only provide access to new types of investors, but have the necessary 
supportive legal framework; as the legal framework in the GCC is rather complex. Heavy 
reliance on USD can be destabilising especially during distress, as international markets dry 
out and liquidity diminishes; making repayments difficult.   Furthermore, the industry 
breakdown suggest that Sukuk seem to be utilised in a wide range of sectors and numerous 
applications; which stands as a promising indication. 
However, although theoretical claims place the emphasis as to how Sukuk could be utilised, 
particularly with regards to infrastructure; sectorial review indicated a dominance of the 
financial sector, with limited focus on infrastructural or projects with productivity enhancing 
character such as manufacturing, communications and industrial utilities.  
Sukuk’s main stability element is regarded to be in the ownership of the assets; an element 
regarded crucial in the case of distress; as holders have access to the underlying assets. 
Reviewing Sukuk defaults in the GCC, proved that the problem was not that investors could 
not reclaim their assets; but that investor’s access to the underlying access was hindered by 
legal challenges. This was unlike conventional securitization deals, were investors were 
faced with the problem of multilayer ownership which made access to the underlying asset 
not feasible. Thus, Sukuk do have a potential to enhance stability if they adhere to the 
Sharia principles of ownership, risk sharing and transparency; whilst avoid trying to be 
similar to conventional bonds.  
On the other hand, Islamic securitization has potential particularly due to its ethical 
foundation and its reliance on real tangible assets; two factors, which if implemented 
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conventionally, would have, arguably, reduced some of the unfavourable outcomes of the 
2008/2007 crash; as real collateral limits the possibilities of speculative activities.  
The review of the underlying collateral indicates the keen focus on the real estate sector, as 
the former is viewed as a real tangible asset. Though, real estate assets are generally 
stable, the sector can face challenges and risks which are important to acknowledge. 
Nevertheless, the main issue impacting the Sukuk stability is the high focus on this sector 
alone. The strong sectorial focus can be alarming particularly as the real estate market faces 
difficulties. Thus, there is a need for diversification in the types of underlying assets; in order 
to enhance the resilience and stability of Sukuk. This can be achieved as issuers originate 
their own Islamically acceptable assets as opposed to buying asset pools in the market. 
Nonetheless, reviewing the different elements of Sukuk, confirms that they are unique 
financial instruments different to conventional bonds. In addition, Sukuk and Islamic 
securitization, remain a largely untapped form of structured finance that can and should be 
regarded as a possible valuable contributor to the stability of the financial environment in 
GGC and the MENA region.  The main stability element is regarded as the ownership claim 
of tangible assets status; which enables greater control over the active management of 
designated asset portfolio by investors; as well as the encouragement of genuine 
transactions through which more business activities could take place as they are based on 
real, identifiable, existing assets. 
Additionally if implemented effectively, the Profit and Loss Share mechanism (PLS) can help 
provide a balance of wealth in the system, which will protect it from collapsing.  Therefore, as 
financial integration is increasing along with the internationalisation of Islamic finance, 
growth in the Sukuk market is set to contribute towards a more holistic growth process whilst 
enhancing financial stability. (Aziz, 2014) 
Sukuk have the potential to benefit from the large amount of high-net-worth individuals in 
many Muslim countries; sceptical about investing there funds in conventional stream.  
Similarly, they can benefit Ministries of Finance and Central Banks of Muslim countries, 
through sovereign Sukuk which can be adopted in debt financing policies.  
Thus, in order to fully exploit the potential of Sukuk in the GCC, a holistic approach is 
needed to facilitate the development of domestic markets as well as facilitate access and 
operations in the international markets.  The development of domestic markets can be 
achieved through ensuring the well-functioning of the money markets; and developing a 
market infrastructure that facilitates trading, price transparency, as well as efficient clearing 
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and settlement of transactions. The GCC Sukuk market could also benefit from developing a 
reliable reference curve which helps establish a uniform benchmark for the particularly large. 
Additionally, the diversification of both underlying assets and investor base will prove to be 
beneficial. (Kusuma & Silva, 2014).   
Yet, reforms are strongly needed in the GCC’s legal framework.  This strongly manifested in 
the Sukuk defaults, which exposed the vulnerability of investors to cross-country differences 
in legal frameworks; as investors’ rights were better protected in countries with stronger 
insolvency regimes. Therefore, the rising volume of cross-border Islamic financial 
transactions implies the urgent need to harmonize regulatory and legal frameworks; 
standardizing contracts, strengthening securitization laws, as well as strengthening domestic 
bankruptcy regimes.  
Sukuk structuring also needs to be reviewed; as Sukuk structures can be very complex 
making it difficult for investors to discern risks. The standardization of contracts as well as 
strengthening the Sharia approval processes would enhance consumer protection and 
reduce the confusion with regards to the different mechanisms. The various structures have 
led to complexities and differences in understanding the documentations, guidelines and 
best business practices. Therefore, transparency between the issuers, investors, traders, 
lawyers, and regulators; will help protect both consumers and investors. (Rasameel, 2013; 
Kusuma & Silva, 2014). Additionally, further professionalism and homogeneity of Sharia 
Boards would boost the recognition of Islamic Finance in global capital markets and unlock 
the growing pool of capital in Islamic countries. (Winjnber & Zaheer., 2013) 
Finally, it’s important to note that in order to achieve the maximum potential and benefits 
from Islamic financial instruments; the former need to adhere to Sahria principles and avoid 
trying to be comparable to conventional bonds. The focus on Islamic Financial principles of 
ownership, risk sharing, transparency and ethical financing; will enable Sukuk to operate 
effectively, achieve their potential as well as enhance their stabilising impact. 
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Appendix: 
  Table 1 Main Sukuk types (Lackman, 2015; Kammer et al, 2015 ) 
Sukuk type Characteristics 
 
Murabaha 
 (mark-up sale) 
Usually used for purchasing products under an instalment sales 
contract. In this type of transaction, an asset is acquired by the 
purchaser (usually a bank); from a third party, at the demand of the 
originator. The product is then resold to the originator at an agreed 
mark-up for immediate or deferred payment in instalments. 
 
Isstisna  
(Supply agreement) 
Generally used in infrastructure and large developmental projects.  In 
this type, the Islamic financial institution funds the project during its 
construction phase, whilst acquiring the title to that asset.  Ownership 
is then passed on to the developer upon competition of the project. 
Salam (futures 
contract) 
The buyer pays the seller the full price of a product, with the promise 
to be delivered at a future date. 
 
Ijarah  
(rental and lease 
agreements) 
Based on a leasing scheme, the financing party purchases property, 
equipment or other asset desired by the originator and then leases it 
to the client for a rental fee. At maturity the originator repurchases the 
underlying asset.  
 
Wakala  
(agency agreement) 
One party (either the bank or client) serves as an agent to the 
originator undertaking transactions on his behalf.  
 
Mudaraba 
 (partnership 
agreement) 
A partnership agreement where the funds to finance a project are 
supplied by the provider of capital; while the entrepreneur offers 
labour and expertise. Profits ratios are agreed upon and are shared 
accordingly. However, in the case on loss, all losses are borne by the 
owner of capital; as the liability of the entrepreneur is restricted only 
to his time and effort. 
 
Musharakah 
 (Equity partnership 
agreement) 
Represents ownership of partnership equity. The financing party and 
originator contribute assets (cash or property) to a joint venture and 
share the generated profits according to predetermined ratios, 
whereas losses are split according to the respective capital 
contributions. 
 
